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Animal cognition experiments frequently reveal striking individual variation but rarely 8 
consider its causes and largely ignore its potential consequences. Studies often focus on a 9 
subset of high-performing subjects, sometimes viewing evidence from a single individual as 10 
sufficient to demonstrate the cognitive capacity of a species. We argue that the emphasis on 11 
demonstrating species-level cognitive capacities detracts from the value of individual 12 
variation in understanding cognitive development and evolution. We consider developmental 13 
and evolutionary interpretations of individual variation and use meta-analyses of data from 14 
published studies to examine predictors of individual performance. We show that reliance on 15 
small sample sizes precludes robust conclusions about individual abilities as well as inter- 16 
and intraspecific differences.  We advocate standardisation of experimental protocols and 17 
pooling of data between laboratories to improve statistical rigour. Our analyses show that 18 
cognitive performance is influenced by age, sex, rearing conditions and previous experience. 19 
These effects limit the validity of comparative analyses unless developmental histories are 20 
taken into account, and complicate attempts to understand how cognitive traits are expressed 21 
and selected under natural conditions. Further understanding of cognitive evolution requires 22 
efforts to elucidate the heritability of cognitive traits and establish whether elevated cognitive 23 
performance confers fitness advantages in nature. 24 
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reproductive fitness 26 
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1. INTRODUCTION 29 
Imagine a team of alien scientists visiting London during the summer of 2012, selecting a 30 
random sample of 20 humans and conducting experiments to test theories of human 31 
evolution. Some trials involve swimming, and most subjects perform rather poorly. However, 32 
one subject happens to be Michael Phelps, the Olympic record holder. Based on Phelps’ 33 
performance, the aliens conclude that humans have an astounding capacity for high-speed 34 
movement through water, underpinned by physiological and behavioural adaptations 35 
including efficient conversion of stored carbohydrates to sugars and fine-scale motor control 36 
for efficient propulsion. From this, they argue in favour of the aquatic ape hypothesis, which 37 
postulates that ancestral humans were under strong selection for an aquatic existence. 38 
 39 
Though this story is a fanciful caricature, it has important parallels in the modern science of 40 
comparative cognition, where great emphasis is often placed on the performance of a small 41 
number of subjects. Striking individual variation in performance is typical of many cognitive 42 
tests, and many influential papers in the field focus on the successful performance of a small 43 
subset of individuals, with relatively little emphasis on those that do not succeed. Indeed, the 44 
remarkable abilities of celebrated animals such as Kanzi the bonobo, Alex the African grey 45 
parrot and Betty the New Caledonian crow are often taken to be indicative of the abilities of 46 
their species as a whole. Here, we consider how individual differences in performance on 47 
cognitive tests might be interpreted from developmental and evolutionary perspectives and 48 
examine predictors of individual performance from data in published papers. 49 
  50 
As Darwin pointed out, individual differences are of critical importance in biology, as they 51 
“afford materials for natural selection to act on” ([1] pp. 59-60). Following this insight, 52 
Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, along with other founding figures of psychology such as 53 
Spearman and Thorndike, placed great emphasis on the differences between individuals, a 54 
tradition that continues today in psychometric research. In contrast, most comparative 55 
researchers tended to pay scant attention to variation within species. Indeed, the behaviourist 56 
tradition in comparative psychology, with its emphasis on universal learning processes [2], 57 
and ethology, with its focus on species-typical adaptations or “instinct” [3], traditionally 58 
ignored individual variation, treating it simply as noise around the population mean.   59 
 60 
More recently, two developments have re-focused attention on individual differences. First, 61 
the influence of Piagetian developmental psychology [4] and the cognitive revolution of the 62 
1950s [5] inspired comparative researchers to develop paradigms to test their subjects’ 63 
capacities to form mental representations, make inferences, reason and even learn language 64 
[6]. Many of these studies involved intensive contact with only one or a few animals, leading 65 
researchers to report individual-level data and notice their subjects’ idiosyncrasies and 66 
individuality. However, the causes of individual differences in test performance were seldom 67 
investigated and their ecological and evolutionary consequences remained unexplored. 68 
 69 
The second advance occurred within behavioural ecology. Long term field studies of 70 
individually recognisable animals allowed researchers to examine individual behaviour in 71 
response to challenges in the physical and social environment and relate behaviour to 72 
reproductive fitness [7]. Over time, it became apparent that animals commonly show 73 
consistent individual differences in behaviour across contexts, leading to the development of 74 
 the field of animal personality [8,9]. Towards the end of the twentieth century, an upsurge of 75 
interest in socially-learned animal traditions and culture led to an increased focus on the 76 
generation and transmission of novel behaviours through populations [10,11]. Consequently, 77 
some researchers began to examine the characteristics of the individual innovators that 78 
generate solutions to novel problems [10]. However, while this research has improved our 79 
understanding of the potential fitness consequences of individual behavioural differences and 80 
the effects of individual characteristics on innovative propensities, it has tended to ignore 81 
underlying psychological mechanisms. Consequently, the variation revealed in cognitive 82 
studies remains difficult to interpret. Systematic analyses are thus necessary to understand 83 
how this variation arises. 84 
 85 
(a) Meta-analyses of individual variation 86 
Rigorous investigations of factors contributing to individual differences are often limited by 87 
low sample sizes. To overcome this limitation, we performed systematic searches of the 88 
animal cognition literature and conducted meta-analyses on data pooled from multiple 89 
studies. We focused on four experimental paradigms, chosen because individual 90 
performances (rather than just mean performances) were reported relatively frequently: 91 
 92 
Object permanence (OP) studies test whether subjects understand that objects continue to 93 
exist when out of sight. Subjects must typically search for an object that has been moved 94 
directly behind one or more barriers (visible displacement) or placed into a container that is 95 
then moved behind one or more barriers (invisible displacement). Performance, generally 96 
measured in relation to Piaget’s six developmental stages of object permanence in children 97 
[4], is assessed by recording where the subject searches for the hidden object.  98 
 Functional properties of objects (FPO) studies test whether subjects recognise the physical 99 
properties that (e.g. length, rigidity) render objects (e.g. tools) suitable for use to access a 100 
reward. Subjects must choose between objects that are suitable or unsuitable for the task 101 
across a number of trials. 102 
Causal reasoning (CR) ‘folk physics’ studies test whether subjects’ ability to gain rewards 103 
from a physical task (often with the use of a tool) is based on an understanding of the causal 104 
structure of the task. Subjects are generally given a series of training trials to learn the basic 105 
requirements of the task. Those that reach a specified criterion are then given one of more 106 
transfer tests of their ability to respond appropriately to the causally relevant features of the 107 
task (e.g. traps where food rewards may fall and be lost). 108 
Mark tests of mirror self-recognition (MSR) examine whether subjects will use a mirror to 109 
inspect a mark placed on some visually inaccessible part of their body. A colourless, 110 
odourless “sham” mark is generally used a control. Elevated levels of mark-directed 111 
behaviour when in front of a mirror are taken as evidence that the subject recognises the 112 
reflection as itself. 113 
 114 
We obtained information on 46 studies of OP, 30 studies of FPO, 28 studies of CR and 14 115 
studies of MSR. Of the 118 studies, only 68 (= 58%) provided information on individual 116 
performance and, of these, 54 reported full information on the sex, age and history of 117 
subjects. We obtained information on subjects’ characteristics in a further seven studies by 118 
cross-referencing other papers or from replies to requests to authors (further details in 119 
electronic supplementary material, ESM). The dataset for subjects with full information 120 
incorporated 42 different species from 1691 individual experiments. To facilitate future 121 
research, we strongly urge researchers in all areas of animal cognition to report the 122 
performances and individual characteristics of their subjects. 123 
  124 
We identified the effects of individual characteristics on performance in experiments using 125 
generalized linear binomial models in R (R Development Core Team, http://www.R-126 
project.org). For all paradigms except MSR, the dependent variable was a binomial term with 127 
the number of successful trials as the numerator and the total number of trials attempted as 128 
the denominator. For MSR, measures of performance differed between studies (e.g. time 129 
spent touching marks; number of touches), so the response was a binary term (1 or 0) 130 
indicating success or failure as coded by experimenters. Separate analyses were run for each 131 
paradigm, including individual identity, species and study as random factors to control for 132 
repeated measures. For CR studies, we ran separate analyses of training trials and transfer 133 
tests. Dependent factors were 'Place of birth’: wild/captivity; 'Rearing history’: mother-134 
reared/hand-reared/enculturated; 'Prior experimental experience’: none/participated in 135 
experiments on other topics/same topic, 'Age’: juvenile/adult and ‘Sex’: female/male. 136 
Additional factors were, for CR studies, whether or not the task involved ‘Tool use’ and, for 137 
OP studies, the respective 'Piagetian stage’: 1-6 and whether the task involved ‘Visible’ or 138 
invisible displacements. We started with full models and identified the significance of each 139 
factor by removing it from the model and comparing the AIC of the two models using 140 
ANOVAS (see Methods, Table S1, Table S2 in ESM). We incorporate our results into a 141 
broader review of the causes of individual cognitive variation and their potential evolutionary 142 
implications. 143 
 144 
2. LIMITATIONS OF THE “COGNITIVE CAPACITY” PERSPECTIVE 145 
Some authors take the view that convincing evidence from a single individual is sufficient to 146 
demonstrate that a given cognitive trait is within the capacity of the species (e.g. [12]). 147 
Although true in a trivial sense, this perspective imposes two important limitations on the 148 
 field. First, it is extremely sensitive to the criteria used to infer success or failure and hence 149 
risks generating both false positives and negatives. Second, it may foster a binary perspective, 150 
treating cognitive traits as either present or absent within a species, rather than falling along a 151 
continuum. This detracts attention from the extent of variation within and between species, 152 
and hence limits the power of the field comparative cognition to be truly comparative. 153 
 154 
(a) What does success or failure really mean? 155 
In many studies, a subject is considered to have passed a test if it chooses the correct option 156 
significantly more often than chance. For instance, in CR studies, subjects that reach criterion 157 
on initial training trials may be presented with transfer tests intended to preclude the use of 158 
learned rules based on visible cues (see [13]). However, as transfer tests typically involve the 159 
same binary choice over multiple trials, subjects could learn a new rule based on the visible 160 
properties of the new task. For instance, a subject adopting a “win-stay, lose-shift” strategy of 161 
repeating its choice if  successful on the first trial or switching if unsuccessful, could attain 162 
nine or ten correct choices out of ten trials, and thus reach criterion without understanding 163 
anything about the causal structure of the problem. It is therefore difficult to say with 164 
certainty that individuals that pass tests really possess the cognitive ability under 165 
investigation. Rather than giving subjects multiple trials of one or two transfer tests, a more 166 
powerful approach may be to provide them with a single trial of many different tests (see also 167 
[14]). Here, spontaneous correct performance despite variations in the visible characteristics 168 
of the apparatus would provide stronger evidence for an understanding of cause-and-effect. 169 
 170 
What of the unsuccessful individuals? Perhaps their cognitive abilities are simply inferior. 171 
Alternatively, echoing MacPhail’s arguments for a lack of species-level intelligence 172 
differences [15], poor performance may instead reflect non-cognitive contextual variables 173 
 including motivation, visual acuity or dexterity. Poor performance could also result not from 174 
deficiencies in the cognitive ability under examination, but from failures to focus on relevant 175 
information and inhibit unnecessary prepotent behavioural responses. For instance, in our 176 
FPO dataset 25% of the subjects that failed showed a 0% success rate, indicating that rather 177 
than choosing at random they adopted a strategy of attending to a cue that was incorrect 178 
(figure S1). Thus, an unfortunate learned association could potentially mask some subjects’ 179 
true abilities. Similarly, in trap-tube tests on New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides), 180 
Taylor et al. [14] argued that failures by some subjects may have resulted from difficulties in 181 
inhibiting the tendency to pull food towards themselves. Standardised measures of inhibitory 182 
control, coupled with detailed analyses of behaviour during successes and failures, as 183 
advocated by Seed et al. [13] and Chappell & Hawes [16] may also prove highly informative 184 
in determining the causes of variation in performance. 185 
 186 
(b) Sample sizes limit comparisons in comparative cognition 187 
Rather than the binary distribution implied by the “cognitive capacity” perspective, many 188 
cognitive traits are likely to show quantitative variation between individuals and species. 189 
However, small sample sizes often limit the potential for systematic analyses of quantitative 190 
data within individuals, within species and between species. At the individual level, protocols 191 
allowing only a few trials or tasks per subject may not provide sensitive measures of 192 
performance. For example, all five chimpanzees in our dataset that participated in more than 193 
five tests of Piagetian stage 6 object permanence failed in at least one of the tests, whereas 194 
seven of the nine subjects given fewer tests showed a 100% success rate across tests. This 195 
suggests that small numbers of tasks are insufficient to capture the true variation in individual 196 
abilities, rendering comparisons between conspecifics difficult. Similarly, in OP (figure 1a), 197 
FPO (figure 1b) and CR transfer tests (figure 1c) larger sample sizes of subjects show greater 198 
 variation between conspecifics (see figure S2, Relationship between sample size and variance 199 
in ESM; note that plots for MSR were not possible as measures of individual success were 200 
binary). Thus, the validity of comparative analyses across species is limited because, for most 201 
species, too few individuals have been tested to determine robust measures of the range of 202 
performance, average performance or maximal performance. Standardised testing may 203 
greatly improve the scope for such comparisons. For example, in a large-scale test battery, 204 
Herrmann et al. found that children consistently outperformed chimpanzees on social but not 205 
physical tasks, suggesting that humans have specialised socio-cognitive skills in addition to 206 
relatively conserved skills for dealing with the physical world [17]. Greater collaboration 207 
between researchers, including greater standardisation of experimental protocols and the use 208 
of online data repositories to facilitate pooled analyses of subjects’ performances from 209 
different laboratories (see [18,19]) will also improve the scope for robust analyses. In 210 
particular, there is ample scope for analyses of the predictors of individual differences, 211 
incorporating information on characteristics such as sex, age, body condition, breeding status 212 
and rearing conditions. 213 
 214 
3. DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES ON COGNITION 215 
Behavioural and cognitive phenotypes, and particularly those associated with cortical brain 216 
regions, tend to show greater plasticity than morphological traits [20]. This plasticity is 217 
particularly prevalent in large-brained species with extended developmental periods [21], 218 
such as the primates and corvids that are the favoured subjects of much current research in 219 
comparative cognition. Consequently, even if methodological and analytical advances allow 220 
for more robust conclusions as to the cognitive abilities of test subjects, our ability to 221 
interpret the evolutionary significance of these abilities may remain limited unless we 222 
examine how cognitive traits are manifested under varying conditions, and how they change 223 
 during development. For many cognitive traits, we may expect to see improvements into 224 
adulthood, as neural systems develop and individuals acquire greater experience. This is 225 
borne out in our analyses of CR transfers, where, across species, adults tend to outperform 226 
juveniles (figure 2c; note that figure 2 shows raw data). In contrast, juveniles outperform 227 
adults in CR training (figure 2d), perhaps due to elevated curiosity or motivation. 228 
Interestingly, developmental trajectories appear to be influenced by sex, with juvenile 229 
females outperforming males while males outperform females in adulthood in FPO (figure 230 
2b). We hope that future meta-analyses will establish the robustness of such sex effects and 231 
spur research into their causes. 232 
 233 
(a) Development, evolution and the “cognitive capacity” perspective 234 
Successful completion of a cognitive task by a small subset of subjects is typically reported 235 
with warnings that “results should be interpreted with caution”. Nevertheless, authors often 236 
go on to claim that the species has a “capacity” for the trait in question and may suggest that 237 
the trait is adaptive or, if the study involves primates, that it represents an “evolutionary 238 
precursor” of a human trait.  However, the fact that the brain of one individual can generate a 239 
particular cognitive solution tells us little about the relative influence of developmental and 240 
genetic factors, the prevalence of the cognitive trait in the population as a whole, or whether 241 
the trait is of adaptive value.  For any given genotype, environmental variation may often 242 
generate a range of phenotypes. Consequently, observations from a small number of 243 
individuals offer limited insights into the range of possible phenotypes, particularly if tests 244 
are conducted in highly artificial environmental conditions. For example, Mr Akira 245 
Haraguchi can recite pi to 83,431 decimal places, but given that this took years of training, 246 
what does it really tell us about human memory capacities in general? One might make 247 
similar arguments about the abilities of certain animals in cognitive tests, particularly given 248 
 that previous experimental experience often leads to substantial increases in performance 249 
(figure 2a, b, d, e). If abilities are only manifested by a few individuals under artificial 250 
conditions and with extensive training, it is difficult to envisage how they could be selected 251 
for. We argue that the field would benefit from moving away from the notion of a species-252 
level cognitive capacity and instead advocate a broader approach, charting how cognitive 253 
abilities vary in response to environmental and genetic factors. 254 
 255 
(b) Effects of rearing environments 256 
Henrich and colleagues [22] have pointed out that, in human psychology, grand claims are 257 
made all too often on the basis of samples of people derived entirely of what they term 258 
WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) societies. They have 259 
argued persuasively that such sampling biases fail to account for developmental influences of 260 
local conditions and cultures and hence fail to explain the diversity of behavioural and 261 
cognitive processes across human populations. In many cases it seems that WEIRD subjects 262 
may in fact be particularly non-representative outliers. For instance, in cross-cultural studies 263 
of the Müller-Lyer visual illusion and economic games testing cooperation, punishment and 264 
fairness, WEIRD subjects differ significantly from people of other backgrounds, typically 265 
clustering at extreme ends of the human distribution [22]. Clearly, perceptual and decision-266 
making processes are subject to developmental influences, and great caution is needed before 267 
making claims of human universals. 268 
 269 
Similar arguments hold true for studies of non-human animals. Comparative cognition relies 270 
to a large extent on captive animals whose developmental trajectories may be radically 271 
different from their free-living counterparts, thus complicating attempts to understand the 272 
function and developmental and evolutionary history of cognitive traits. In some cases, the 273 
 captive environment may artificially dampen abilities typical of wild animals. For instance, 274 
Boesch has argued that the poor performance of captive chimpanzees in experimental studies 275 
of prosociality and cooperation is at odds with their seemingly complex cooperation and 276 
coordination when hunting or encountering rival groups in the wild [23,24]. While claims of 277 
cognitive sophistication derived from observational data on wild animals in the absence of 278 
experiments must be taken with a pinch of salt [25], we must also be careful in judging 279 
seemingly poor abilities in caged subjects. There may also be instances in which the relative 280 
comfort and lack of risk in captivity may result in artificially elevated results. For example, 281 
the presence of abundant food and lack of predation pressure may facilitate the persistence of 282 
arbitrary, socially learned traditions [26] and promote the manufacture and use of tools in 283 
normally non-tool using species [27,28]. Impressive feats by captive animals may be the 284 
manifestation of cognitive abilities latent in their wild counterparts, but unless we understand 285 
the developmental inputs necessary for such abilities to be expressed we cannot begin to 286 
unravel how they evolved. 287 
 288 
Differences in rearing environments also have important implications for comparisons 289 
between species, or between conspecifics. Social or physical deprivation during early life can 290 
alter patterns of gene expression [29] and lead to severe impairments in neural, emotional and 291 
cognitive development [30–32]. At the other extreme, enculturation in great apes has been 292 
suggested to promote an understanding of intentions which would not otherwise develop 293 
[33]. Comparative studies between or within species may therefore only be appropriate if 294 
variations in rearing environments are taken into account. For instance, comparisons of 295 
captive non-humans with “wild” (but typically WEIRD) humans might simply reveal the 296 
outcome of differing developmental environments, rather than realised species differences in 297 
ability [23,24]. Indeed, unlike orphaned, sanctuary-raised chimpanzees [17], enculturated 298 
 chimpanzees’ social skills appear comparable to those of children [34]. Similarly, in our 299 
dataset, enculturated individuals consistently outperformed others across all paradigms except 300 
MSR (figure 2a-d). In addition, hand-reared individuals outperformed mother-reared subjects 301 
in OP (figure 2a) and CR transfer tests (figure 2c). An understanding of individual variation 302 
between and within species must incorporate analyses of the effects of differences in 303 
developmental histories. 304 
 305 
4. INDIVIDUAL VARAIATION AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE 306 
When a subject performs well in a cognitive test, does it have a specific aptitude for the 307 
ability under investigation, or might it be an all-rounder with elevated abilities across 308 
cognitive domains? The dominant, ecological approach in comparative cognition tends to 309 
emphasise cognitive adaptations to specific environmental challenges [6]. Perhaps as a result, 310 
individual performance in a given test tends to be interpreted in isolation despite the fact that, 311 
for many subjects, information is available from a multitude of different experiments. The 312 
extent to which individual cognitive abilities are specialised in particular domains has major 313 
implications for debates regarding mental modularity that are the focus of Call’s contribution 314 
to this issue [35], so we review the evidence only briefly here. 315 
 316 
In human psychometric tests, individual cognitive performances tend to correlate strongly 317 
across different domains. Typically, up to 50% of the variance in cognitive test batteries is 318 
accounted for by a single factor, termed “general intelligence” or g. G factors across different 319 
test batteries tend to be strongly positively correlated, and are associated with key health and 320 
life outcomes (reviewed in [36,37]). However, despite these important findings, comparative 321 
researchers have largely eschewed g, so little is known about how general intelligence 322 
evolved, the mechanisms underpinning it, or how it is manifested across species. 323 
  324 
Recent meta-analyses are suggestive of genus-level differences in general intelligence among 325 
primates, with great apes consistently out-performing other genera across cognitive domains 326 
[38,39]. However, similar analyses including non-primates remain difficult due to sample size 327 
limitations and differences in experimental protocols. In our dataset, information from more 328 
than one experimental paradigm is available for only 16 of the 42 species and, for these, 329 
performance in one paradigm does not predict performance in others (figure S3; figure S4). 330 
Moreover, in studies of FPO and in the training phases of CR experiments, ‘study’ but not 331 
‘species’ as a random term accounted for a substantial proportion of the total variance, 332 
suggesting that variation in experimental design between studies precludes detection of 333 
species-level differences (table S2, figure S3). In OP, MSR and CR transfer tests our analyses 334 
did show significant differences between species (table S2), but these may be of limited 335 
validity. First, contrary to expectation, closely related species were not similar in performance 336 
(table S3). Second, performances between studies may not always be comparable. For 337 
example, pigeons appear to score very highly in mark tests of MSR, but this is due to the use 338 
of an intensive training regimen [40]. The fact that species rankings differed between the 339 
paradigms may therefore be explained by variation in experimental design rather than a lack 340 
of species-level intelligence differences. 341 
 342 
At the individual level, the evidence for general intelligence remains equivocal. Two recent 343 
field experiments on birds found no clear intercorrelations between tasks [41,42], while in 344 
song sparrows Melospiza melodia, individual song repertoire size (an indicator of vocal 345 
learning ability) correlated positively with performance on a laboratory test of inhibitory 346 
control, but not with performance on a motor task, colour association learning or reversal 347 
learning [43]. More standardised test batteries showed evidence for a g factor accounting for 348 
 more than 30% of variance in performance in mice (Mus musculus; reviewed in [44]), and 349 
weaker but statistically significant effects in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) [45]. 350 
However, like many human psychometric test batteries, these studies employed a narrow 351 
range of tasks with the emphasis on physical problem solving and few if any tests of social 352 
cognition. Individual-level analyses of Herrmann et al.’s test battery, which comprised equal 353 
numbers of social and physical tasks, found little support for a unitary g factor. Instead, 354 
performance among children was best explained by separate spatial, physical and social 355 
factors, while for chimpanzees physical and social cognition loaded onto a single factor, in 356 
addition to the spatial factor [46].  Analyses by Vonk & Povinelli of the performance of seven 357 
chimpanzees across 136 tasks over more than a decade also failed to provide strong support 358 
for a unitary g factor. Here, one female, Megan, generally outperformed her peers, showing 359 
similar accuracy in physical and social tasks, but other subjects appeared to be more 360 
specialised in one or other domain [47]. The great wealth of data from comparative cognition 361 
laboratories will be invaluable in understanding the extent of individual cognitive 362 
specialisations in non-human animals. 363 
 364 
5. INDIVIDUAL VARIATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF COGNITION 365 
A central aim of comparative cognition is to elucidate the evolutionary origins of cognitive 366 
mechanisms across species. Two central components of this aim are efforts to delineate and 367 
categorise cognitive mechanisms (e.g. [16,48–50], this issue) and implement phylogenetic 368 
analyses to reconstruct their evolutionary history [19]. Equally importantly, we must seek to 369 
determine the selective pressures driving cognitive evolution by considering individual 370 
variation in its ecological and evolutionary context. Natural selection acts on heritable traits 371 
that confer a competitive advantage in access to resources or mating opportunities. 372 
 Consequently, when a subset of subjects appears to be capable of a certain cognitive feat, we 373 
must ask two questions. First, is the trait heritable? Second, does it confer fitness benefits? 374 
 375 
(a) Heritability of cognitive traits 376 
The extent to which the cognitive abilities of parents are inherited by their offspring is central 377 
to our understanding of cognitive evolution, but has received surprisingly little attention from 378 
comparative researchers and most work has been conducted on humans. Twin and adoption 379 
studies have consistently revealed that a substantial proportion of the variance in general 380 
intelligence can be attributed to genetic influences, with estimates ranging from 30-80%, 381 
increasing with age [36]. Strong genetic influences have also been reported for various brain 382 
structures and regions, for elements of brain functioning [51], and for specialised abilities 383 
such as face perception and recognition  [52,53]. Nevertheless, at a molecular level, there are 384 
still no genetic loci reliably associated with intelligence in healthy individuals. Indeed, 385 
continuous variation in cognitive abilities is likely to be influenced by numerous interacting 386 
quantitative trait loci, rather than being closely associated with particular genes [36]. 387 
 388 
A growing number of studies also points towards a significant genetic contribution to 389 
individual cognitive variation in non-humans (reviewed in [54,55]). Perhaps the strongest 390 
evidence comes from insects, where experiments have shown rapid divergence in associative 391 
learning abilities in artificial selection lines [54]. Moreover, high-learning lines show 392 
concomitant declines in larval competitive ability, suggesting that evolutionary trade-offs 393 
play a role in maintaining genetic variation in associative learning abilities [56]. The extent of 394 
genetic influences on the more specialised cognitive abilities that are the principal focus of 395 
contemporary comparative cognition remains unknown. Are the top performers in cognitive 396 
tests likely to produce bright offspring? The small number of subjects in most comparative 397 
 laboratories will limit our ability to answer this question, but two recent developments 398 
provide cause for hope. First, research is increasingly revealing a host of often surprisingly 399 
sophisticated cognitive abilities in invertebrates, fish, rodents and other animals that can be 400 
kept in large numbers [57–59] and are thus amenable to quantitative and molecular genetic 401 
studies. Second, there is a growing emphasis on studying cognition in the wild. Field 402 
researchers have developed a host of ingenious experimental methods to examine a range of 403 
cognitive abilities, including navigation in a range of invertebrates and vertebrates [60], 404 
spatial memory in hummingbirds and passerines [61] physical cognition in tool-using birds 405 
and primates [62–64] and social cognition in group-living mammals [65,66]. Moreover, novel 406 
statistical techniques now allow identification of multiple co-occurring mechanisms of 407 
learning and cognition in natural populations [67], while quantitative geneticists are 408 
developing increasingly sophisticated tools to map the genetic structure of behavioural and 409 
neuroanatomical traits within populations [68,69]. The integration of these approaches, 410 
particularly in taxa such as birds where genetic and environmental effects can be manipulated 411 
through cross-fostering, is likely to yield important insights in coming years.  412 
 413 
(b) Do cognitive abilities confer fitness benefits? 414 
Might the variation we see in cognitive tests have evolutionary consequences? Evolutionary 415 
hypotheses typically invoke adaptive advantages of cognitive abilities, from extracting 416 
embedded food items [70] to manipulating or learning from conspecifics [71,72], yet the 417 
consequences of individual cognitive variation are rarely tested explicitly. Studies 418 
investigating whether and how individual variation in cognition is reflected in reproductive 419 
success is essential to further our understanding of cognitive evolution. 420 
 421 
 The most direct approach is to move out of the laboratory and examine how variation in the 422 
cognitive abilities of wild animals relates to their ability to compete for resources and mates 423 
and, ultimately, to maximise their genetic contribution to the next generation. No study has 424 
yet related individual cognitive variation directly to reproductive fitness, but recent work on 425 
great tits (Parus major) provides evidence for a relationship between cognition and 426 
competitive abilities. Cole & Quinn quantified individual tits’ propensities to solve a novel 427 
lever-pulling foraging task (presumed to reflect underlying cognitive traits) and explore a 428 
new environment (a personality trait on the proactive-reactive axis) in standardised 429 
conditions in captivity, finding that both traits showed high individual repeatability. 430 
Interestingly, while exploratory behaviour correlated positively with the ability to 431 
competitively monopolise food resources in the wild, problem-solving was negatively 432 
correlated with competitive ability [73]. These findings raise the intriguing possibility that 433 
poor competitors may employ elevated cognitive abilities as an alternative strategy to obtain 434 
resources. However, it is important to note that the psychological processes underpinning 435 
problem-solving in this study and the extent to which they are under cognitive control are 436 
unknown. It may be that, rather than understanding anything about the logical structure of the 437 
task, successful problem solvers simply persist in manipulating the task at random until they 438 
are rewarded [74,75]. 439 
 440 
In addition to their potential role in obtaining resources, cognitive traits may come under 441 
sexual selection if individuals value the abilities of prospective partners. In humans, ample 442 
evidence suggests that individuals of both sexes place great value on cognitive abilities when 443 
choosing mates (e.g. [76,77]). Moreover, general intelligence, measured through cognitive 444 
test batteries, correlates positively with male semen quality, suggesting a possible link 445 
between cognition and fitness [78]. In other species, the strongest links between 446 
 psychological traits and fitness have been found in studies of bird song. The development of 447 
song control nuclei in the brain is highly sensitive to stressors in early life. Consequently, 448 
males that experience relatively benign developmental conditions, or whose genotypes confer 449 
resilience to stressors tend to learn songs that are more attractive to females and have 450 
elevated reproductive success [79]. There is also some evidence to suggest that good singers 451 
may perform better on foraging tasks, raising the possibility that song-learning may be related 452 
to other cognitive traits [43]. Beyond song learning, the most compelling evidence for a 453 
relationship between mate choice and cognition comes from a recent study on satin bower 454 
birds (Ptilonorhynchus violaceus). Keagy et al. [80] presented birds with two problem-455 
solving tasks that exploited males’ aversion to red objects on their bowers. Males that were 456 
quicker to remove or cover up offending objects obtained more copulations than did poor 457 
problem-solvers. However, as with other studies of innovative problem-solving, the cognitive 458 
abilities (if any) involved in removing or covering red objects have not been characterised. 459 
Moreover, as females did not directly observe males’ problem-solving performance, their 460 
mate choice preferences must have been mediated by other, unmeasured intervening 461 
variables. 462 
 463 
While studies of the fitness consequences of conserved learning mechanisms and general 464 
problem solving capacities are beginning to generate important insights [54,55,73], they may 465 
tell us little about the consequences of variation in “higher” processes such as inferential 466 
learning, causal reasoning or theory of mind that are the focus of much attention in 467 
comparative cognition. Arguably the strongest, albeit indirect, evidence that variance in such 468 
abilities impacts on fitness comes from studies of wild cercopithecine primates. Here, 469 
playback experiments have revealed that cognitive abilities including transitive inference, 470 
recognition of third-party relationships and representations of hierarchically structured 471 
 relationships underpin the formation and maintenance of social relationships [65,81]. There is 472 
also clear evidence that the quality of individuals’ social bonds has major fitness 473 
consequences for both males and females [82,83]. Together, these two lines of evidence 474 
suggest that, in these species, it pays to be smart. Of course, it is possible that much of the 475 
individual variation captured in cognitive tests merely represents non-adaptive phenotypic 476 
plasticity with no functional consequences (see [54]). However, if we are to understand how 477 
cognition evolves, further research linking carefully characterised individual differences in 478 
cognitive abilities with reproductive success in wild animals is a clear priority.  479 
 480 
6. CONCLUSIONS 481 
Far from being mere noise, information on individual differences is critical for the future 482 
development of the field of comparative cognition. Rather than focusing on the most 483 
successful or apparently human-like performances among test subjects, we advocate a move 484 
towards explicit consideration of the factors that generate individual differences. We urge 485 
researchers to report individual characteristics and performance (including negative results) 486 
as a matter of course, to develop standardised protocols to facilitate comparisons between 487 
studies wherever possible and to deposit results in online repositories to facilitate meta-488 
analyses. Careful examination of the factors influencing individual performance can help 489 
unravel the developmental influences on cognitive traits and assist in determining whether 490 
variation represents adaptive plasticity in response to local conditions. In time, collated 491 
datasets may also permit us to develop sophisticated phylogenetic analyses charting not only 492 
the presence or absence of cognitive traits, but also their relative prevalence in different 493 
species. Finally, we must ask whether individual differences in cognitive traits are heritable 494 
and whether they have consequences for reproductive fitness. Together, these different 495 
 approaches can harness the value of individual cognitive variation to unravel the evolution of 496 
animal minds. 497 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 720 
Figure 1: Variation in success rates of individuals of different species in experiments of (a) 721 
object permanence, (b) object properties and (c) causality transfers. Each dot represents a 722 
single individual; dots arranged in a single vertical line represent multiple individuals from 723 
one species. Variation among individuals within species increases with sample size, limiting 724 
the validity of between-species comparisons where few individuals have been tested. 725 
Species from left to right, with sample sizes of individuals and number of studies in brackets:  726 
(a) Ara maracana (1 individual/1 study); Macaca fuscata(1/1); Melopsittacus undulatus (1/1); Nymphicus 727 
hollandicus (1/1); Gorilla gorilla (2/2); Nomascus gabriellae (2/1); Nomascus leucogenys (2/1); Pan paniscus 728 
(2/1); Psittacus erithacus (2/2); Symphalangus syndactylus (2/1); Cebus capuchinus (3/1); Leucopsa rothschildi 729 
(3/1); Oreonax flavica (3/1); Garrulus glandarius (4/1); Hylobates lar (4/1); Streptopelia risoria (4/1); Macaca 730 
mulatta (7/2); Saimiri sciureus (7/1); Saguinus oedipus (8/1); Tursiops truncatus (8/1); Callitrhix jacchus 731 
(11/1); Pongo pygmaeus (12/3); Pan troglodytes (18/8); Canis canis (32/2); Felis catus (33/2). 732 
(b) Corvus moneduloides (2 individuals/2 studies); Octodon degus (4/1); Cactospiza pallida (5/1); Gorilla 733 
gorilla (6/1); Pongo pygmaeus (8/2); Cebus libidinosus (10/3); Cebus apella (19/3); Pan troglodytes (22/3). 734 
(c) Gorilla gorilla (3 individuals/2 studies); Bunopithecus hoolock (4/1); Corvus moneduloides (7/2); 735 
Cactospiza pallida (9/2); Pan paniscus (9/3); Pongo pygmaeus (9/3); Cebus apella (10/3); Corvus frugilegus 736 
(10/2); Pan troglodytes (18/5).  737 
 738 
Figure 2: Success rate by individual characteristics in experiments of (a) object permanence, 739 
(b) object properties, (c) causality transfer, (d) causality training and (e) mirror self-740 
recognition. The black lines in the boxplots (a)-(d) depict the median percentage of trials 741 
solved in a given experiment, with boxes and whiskers indicating the quantiles. Values are 742 
based on raw data and can contain multiple entries per individual. The bars in (e) depict the 743 
 percentage of individuals deemed by experimenters to have passed the mark test. Lines above 744 
the boxplots and bars connect values that are significantly different in GLMM analyses, 745 
correcting for other factors. Stars indicate significant differences: two stars indicate 746 
categories with significantly higher success rates than those with one star, which in turn had 747 
higher success rates than those with no stars. Note that, as the figure shows raw data, not 748 
controlling for other significant factors, some significant differences are not apparent from 749 
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